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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

BRYAN O. RASMUSSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Case No. 950521-CA
Priority No. 2
:

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 provides:
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.
(1)
(a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used
in this section means the defendant and two or more
other persons would be criminally liable for the
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2)
(a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases
or the information or indictment in felony cases
notice that the defendant
is subject to the
enhanced penalties provided under this section.
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and
in addition to the substantive offense charged.
(b)
If
the
subscription
is
not
included
initially, the court may subsequently allow the
prosecutor to amend the charging document to
include the subscription if the court finds the
charging documents, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of
the allegation he committed the offense in concert
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the
defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3)
The enhanced penalties for offenses committed
under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90
consecutive
days
in a jail or other
secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 180

consecutive days in a
correctional facility.

jail

or

other

secure

(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter
37,
3 7a, 3 7b, or 3 7c, regarding
drug-related
offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in
Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6,
Part
5,
except
Sections
76-6-503,
76-6-504,
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510,
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516,
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520;
(1)
any
offense
of
obstructing
government
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8,
except
Sections
76-8-302,
76-8-303,
76-8-304,
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation
of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 3;
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(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter
10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic
and harmful materials and
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section
76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction
Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in
Section 76-10-2002.
(5)
(a) This section does not create any separate
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the
primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons with
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are
not identified,
apprehended,
charged,
or
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty
under this section. The imposition of the penalty
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing
judge
that
this
section
is
applicable.
In
conjunction With sentencing the court shall enter
written
findings
of
fact
concerning
the
applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution
of the sentence required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be
best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying
the disposition on the record and in writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202

(1995) provides:

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct
commission of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,

encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

The fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship —
protection.]

Due process of law —

Equal

All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of las; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]
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No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to
a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment
Grand jury.]

—

Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
5

examination be waived by the accused with the consent
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]

All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT
HERE.
(Responding to State's brief at Statement of Facts
at p. 5; Point I.B. (pp. 11-13); Point I.D.
at p. 16; Point III.B. at p. 27)
A.

MR. RASMUSSEN'S ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED
"AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE" IS NOT AN
ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED "IN CONCERT WITH
TWO OR MORE PERSONS."

The State asserts that "[w]hen he pleaded guilty,
Rasmussen admitted that he acted 'as a party to' the offenses (R.
43-45, 94-96), thereby admitting the factual predicate for the
section 76-3-203.1 'in concert' sentence enhancement."
Appellee at 5.

Br.

Mr. Rasmussen did in fact admit that he acted "as

a party to" the offenses.

However, this language merely tracks

the usual formulation of charging informations.

E.g. State v.

Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 994 (Utah 1993) ("Ricky Brad Abeyta, a
party to the offense . . . " ) ; State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 153
6

(Utah 1989) ("GARY CHARLES T R I P ^
. .

P* • t \

•••

ffense
• *)

" ) ; State v. Jamison, 7

("James Jamison, a part\ >> \ {n: ^ttens
<• ~ •* •' •

opies 01 k.

attached as Addendum A.

adinissic:: ,."-:

Nowhere is there any

Rasmussen committed the crimes "in concert

with two cr more persons."
r

dUiuiLced Liie

underlying offenses

:.. ,..= •. i"j. .L rima .*:,•«. ,, ,. ...^ p^ntences and

possible enhancement.;-; woi;.id be- applicable."

:

r

Rasmussen

•

the underlying offenses..

1

Se^.r ion .'n-.i <:w •

.-:..-;:-

. ;. ;..i.g

K v r h--* sentenfT'-i itHo^ ina! rhe defendant, committed 1 ::e crime
. - ' - • ' • :

:

' ••

'

:

-

• •

w

- "

-'O

evidence from wise:: : ri-r t rial c-urt coi;:d r *=asonabl . !;;ake that
finding.

pleas to only thv- underlying offenses also /oust, i t: ute an
ni^^sir

-tv i Me O snq enhancement is applicable contradicts its

concert" activity ;.y a separate element of a newly defined
aggravated crimo
a t t

f: : : • ; = ! .

_"

.v; 1 snoujd be proven at trd al v * .:
. ../- 1 ;- ;';

». J1 <.:i < ^

:•

j 1 1C ] I I ill] T i g

! ; rhe

1 1 l£i

unanimous iur\ deterrninatior ••-. proof beyond a reasonable ooubt..
Br. Appellant, Poin. ; vpp. 11- 23).
J

The State has steadfastly

It ,s, o: couise, permissible foi a defendant to adnii t the
factual predicate f-. • any enhancement, but thi s did not occur in
the sase ^t b?,7

opposed this contention.

Memorandum Supporting the

Constitutionality of Gang Enhancement Statute, R. 29-38 at 34
("Sentencing under U.C.A. § 76-3-203.1 includes the determination
that the defendant committed the criminal act in concert with two
or more persons.").

Mr. Rasmussen's pleas to the underlying

offenses alone can only constitute an admission of the in concert
activity if in concert activity is an element.

If, as the State

has argued, it is merely a sentencing consideration, then the
plea to the underlying offense, by itself, cannot be an admission
that the sentencing enhancement is applicable.
The State cannot have it both ways.

If the in concert

activity is a necessary element of a new offense, Mr. Rasmussen's
motion should have been granted and he prevails here.

If not,

then his pleas to only the underlying offenses are insufficient
to support application of the enhanced sentence, and the
enhancements must be vacated.
B.

TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT CONCEDE THAT THE
GANG ENHANCEMENT WAS PROPERLY
APPLICABLE.

The State further asserts that Mr. Rasmussen "agreed"
that the enhancement was applicable, citing to R. 105.
Appellee at 11.

Br.

The page referenced by the State concerned the

degree of the enhancement, if any, that was applicable in light
of the fact that the theft charges, which were originally 2nd
degree felonies, were reduced to 3rd degree felonies as a result
of the legislature's amendment of the offense level
classifications in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)
8

(effective M a y 3 , 1 ^ *'-*)

9^f:

*

.':

motion and stipulation to

reduce c a t e g o i y ::> f
Defense c *-r^l
i

----d.

-si'- u- \ agree that any enhancement

ilie - ' - •- i • ^eement does not indicate that a n y

tjuci* darruo.^. •:. --.is part . : . •

:>argain.

Absent a n y such

agreement as p.i?" •'** * n- p; ea bargain, defense counse] wou] d
;•r

assert, m u cuai

.

ancj z e a

ious

representation

by

i . i* * . . *-i. ;. o.^ ... i u receive a harsher sentence.

State v. Holland, 2fil Utah Adv. Rep
C.

- ,t ; '9'-).

T H E GANG ENHA:^MJi:\i i i-.-- A .:J A^PijiED IN
A PERFUNCTORY MANNER, WITH N O EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT ITS APPLICATION,

T h ^ State asserts that " [b]ecause Rasmussen never
s u b i i: i :i 11 e d

-

;

t" i s s u e a n d t h e :ii n t e n t o f 1 :i :i s c o -

perpetrators t o any adve r s a r i a 1 t e s t i rig, he c anno t c omp 1 a in that
the issue wou] d have been perfunctori] y decided, or too
c o nip ] i c a t e d £ <:: i !:: 1 I e 1 1 :i a ] c o i 11 1: t: : ci e c :i d e ,
A p p e l l e e at 11-12.
not d on that M r

:i i i 1: :i :i s ::: a s e . '' B r.

This proposition rests o n the incorrect

Rasmussen either admitted he acted :i n concert, or

st:i pi i] a t e d t h a t tl le ei ll lai lcemei it cou] d be app] :i ed t : h :i in
contrary, n o such admissions or stipulations are contained

!

-_he

record.
1 1 ] : R a s ii:n I s s e i I a p p e a r e d a t s e n t e n c :i i i g , r e p r e s e
c o u n s e l , and the matter of hi s sentence w a s subjected to
adversarial testing.
'•'•--•,

-;-.-..•.

. -= '

See Angus'
; , II

< *• : rt -r ' ;- T r a n s c rot of
-OJSO

State put on no evidence concerning any codefendants or uncharged

other actors, their actions, or their mental states.

R. 109.

The trial court's findings fail to identify any such other
actors, what their involvement was, or the nature of their
criminal mens

rea.

Based on the dearth of evidence before the

trial court, no such findings could be made.
The sum total of what was before the judge concerning
in concert activity consists of the bare allegations of the
information, R. 7-11.

The information, sworn to by Det. J. W.

Prior, asserts:
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Agent Jeff
Sarnacki will testify that on December 17, 1994, he
interviewed defendant Cheeney. After being informed of
his constitutional rights and freely agreeing to speak
without an attorney present, defendant Cheeney admitted
to all of the above conduct and that defendant
Rasmussen had been involved with him. Defendant
Cheeney also admitted that defendant Hoffman was
involved in all but the Sundance Institute burglary and
theft.
R. 11.

Criminal informations are not evidence.

If they were,

there would be little need for preliminary hearings:

the

information could be used to establish by a preponderance all of
the allegations.

See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah

1995) (probable cause standard is lower than preponderance
standard).
Additionally, the information suffers from multiple
hearsay problems.

Det. Prior is reporting concerning information

relayed to him by unknown means concerning statements allegedly
made by co-defendant Cheeney to ATF agent Sarnacki.

This

information is at best triple hearsay, and as a matter of due
process is insufficiently reliable to be relied on at sentencing.
10

8r~- P 2d

State v. Johnson

c^--;
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hearsay ev; . .
double hearsay
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The gang enhancement in this case was applied in a most
perfunctory manner, based on nothing more than the bare
allegations of the charging information.
violated.

Due process has been

The gang enhancements imposed must be vacated.

POINT II. UNDER McMILLAN. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT
EXCEEDS THE FEDERAL DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS
OF OFFENSE DEFINITION AS THE TAIL (THE GANG
ENHANCEMENT) IS WAGGING THE DOG (THE
UNDERLYING OFFENSE).
(Responding to State's Brief at Point I.D. (pp.
15-17)
Under McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct.
2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the legislature's designation of "in
concert" activity as a sentencing consideration rather than a
substantive element violates due process.

As explained earlier,

the State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen never "demanded a
factfinding procedure of any nature, by jury or otherwise," Br.
Appellee at 16, is not well taken.

First, Mr. Rasmussen

requested that the trial court hold that the issue of "in
concert" activity should be decided by a jury at trial.

R. 25-6.

Mr. Rasmussen did not waive sentencing; the State was required to
establish a factual predicate for the application of the gang
enhancement at the sentencing hearing.

Having failed to do so,

the enhancement is not applicable.
The State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen cites no
authority, Br. Appellee at 16, is frivolous.

McMillan is cited

repeatedly, Br. Appellant at 13-15, 18, 19, and mandates that the
statutory scheme here be held unconstitutional.
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The State's content! on that two thirds of the necessary facts
were shown here is not well taken. While Mr. Rasmussen did plead
guilty to counts 111 through V, on which he was sentenced to the
gang enhancement, co-defendant Cheeney only pled to counts 1 and
II, the Sundance Institute burglary and theft, for which Mr.
Rasmussen was not sentenced to a gang enhancement. See Addendum B.
Even if Mr. Cheeney had pled to counts III through V, the
State would be one third short. While "two 01 it of three ain't
bad," due process requ ires consi derab] y more.
] 3

we have a dog that is wagged by its tail.

The gang enhancement

should be declared unconstitutional under McMillan.
This Court quite recently held that whether a drug
offense was committed within 1000 feet of a park is an additional
element that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Powasnik, No. 960116-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah

App. May 31, 1996) (M[T]oday we explicitly announce the penalty
enhancement statute adds an extra element to those drug offenses
that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier
of fact who decides the predicate offense.11).

Even in the

context of determining a mere distance from a tangible place,
this Court has decided that that single fact should be presented
to the jury.

Here, with the multitude of facts inherent in the

two entire additional criminal offenses required by the gang
enhancement, jury determination is only more necessary and
appropriate.

POINT III. MR. RASMUSSENfS INDEPENDENT STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT CONCERNING
LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSE DEFINITION IS
MERITORIOUS AND PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW.
(Responding to State's Brief at Point I.E. (pp.
17-19)
Mr. Rasmussen argued independent state constitutional
analysis in the trial court.

The trial court was cited to State

v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982).

R. 26.

Wedge was

decided exclusively under article I, section 11 of the Oregon
Constitution.

Wedge, 652 P.2d at 775.
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POINT V. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS NOT TRUE TO ITS
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
(Responding to State's Brief at Point II (pp. 1923)
A.

RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ARE MERE
TOOLS FOR DISCOVERING LEGISLATIVE
INTENT, AND MAY NOT BE USED TO SUBVERT
THE LEGISLATURE'S TRUE INTENT WHEN THAT
INTENT IS UNEQUIVOCALLY EXPRESSED IN THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.

The State correctly notes that in the ordinary case,
appellate courts should not look beyond the plain language of a
statute when that language is unambiguous.

Br. Appellee at 22.

However, the case at bar is not the ordinary case.

The

legislative history unmistakably reveals that the legislature
deliberately wrote the statute in broad terms to avoid perceived
(but unrealized) constitutional defects.

The undisputed

underlying intent, however, was that the statute only apply to
members of criminal street gangs.

The rules of statutory

construction are mere tools to ascertain legislative intent, and
cannot be applied to contravene the true intent of the
legislature that the gang enhancement apply only to criminal
street gang members:
The fundamental consideration which transcends all
others in regard to the interpretation and application
of a statute is: What was the intent of the
legislature?" All other rules of statutory
construction are subordinate to it and are helpful only
insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In
determining that intent the statute should be
considered in the light of the purpose it was designed
to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if
that can be done consistent with its language.
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Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966)
(footnote cites om:i tted) .
[H]elpful as rules of construction often are, they are
useful guides, but poor masters; and they should not be
regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the
force of law,, or distort an otherwise natural meaning
or intent." Their only legitimate function is to
assist in ascertaining the true intent and purpose of
the statute. []
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In addition,
one of the fundamental rules i.,-i ->, « K. U , ^: y
construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and ir ; igh- M the
general purpose it was intended to serve;
and should be so interpreted and applied as
to accomplish that objective. In order to
give the statute the implem.en.tei.tion which

which

": m u s t

will fulfill its purpose, reason and
intention sometimes prevail over technically
applied literalness.
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972,
974 (1965) .
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that, in spite of a statute's plain language, statutes must be
construed in accord with the legislature's intent.

In Church of

the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct.
511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892), the Court held:
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not; within the statute,
because not within its spirit nor within the intention
of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the
Reports are full of cases illustrating its application.
This is not the substitution of the will of the judge
for that of the legislator; for frequently words of
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad
enough to include an act in question, and yet a
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the
absurd results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe
that the legislator intended to include the particular
act.
The Supreme Court was interpreting a statute which read:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company,
partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever,
to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or
aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United
States, its territories, or the District of Columbia,
under contract or agreement, parol or special, express
or implied, made previous to the importation or
migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or
foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in
the United States, its territories, or the District of
Columbia.
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.

Despite the plain

language of the statute, the Court held it inapplicable to the
18

church, which had arranged for the transport of an Englishman to
serve as rector and pastor at the church in New York City.

The

legislative history made clear that "the intent of congress was
simply to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor."
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465.
Numerous other Supreme Court cases are in accord.
E.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989):
The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive,
except in the "rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973
(1982). In such cases, the intention of the drafters,
rather than the strict language, controls. Ibid.
Id. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 1031;

National R. R. Passenger Corp. v.

National Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct.
690, 693, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) ("But even the most basic general
principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary
evidence of legislative intent."); United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 84 L.Ed. 1345
(1940) :
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did
not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole' [] this Court has followed that
purpose, rather than the literal words." When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule
of law' which forbids its"use," however clear the
words may appear on 'superficial examination.'n
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Id. at 543-4, 60 S.Ct. at 1064 (footnote cites omitted); Harrison
v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407
(1943) :
But words are inexact tools at best and for that reason
there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to
explanatory legislative history no matter how "clear
the words may appear on 'superficial examination.111
Id. at 479, 63 S.Ct. at 363; see also Burlington Northern R. Co.
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 95 L.Ed.2d
404 (1987):
Legislative history can be a legitimate guide to a
statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity, but "[i]n the
absence of a 'clearly expressed legislative intention
to the contrary,' the language of the statute itself
'must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' "
United
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606, 106 S.Ct. 3116,
3121, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986) (quoting Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108,
100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). Unless
exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, "[w]hen we
find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial
inquiry is complete." Rubin v. United States, 44 9 U.S.
424, 430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981).
Id. at 461, 107 S.Ct. at 1860; United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 73 S.Ct. 227, 230, 97 L.Ed. 260
(1952) ("Instead of balancing the various generalized axioms of
experience in construing legislation, regard for the specific
history of the legislative process that culminated in the Act now
before us affords more solid ground for giving it appropriate
meaning."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158
n.3, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 2241 n.3, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) ("Absent a
clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the
statutory language controls its construction.").
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In pursuit of brevity, courts have frequently
abbreviated discussion of statutory construction down to a simple
statement such as "unambiguous language controls" or "the
specific controls the general," without discussing that the
purpose of all statutory construction is to determine legislative
intent.

While these quick and easy catch phrases serve well in a

majority of cases, and result in an interpretation in accord with
legislative intent, in those cases (as here) where legislative
intent is to the contrary the statutes must be construed so as to
give effect to that legislative intent.
B.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE
GANG ENHANCEMENT WERE CREATED BY THE
LEGISLATURE, NOT BY APPELLANT'S READING
OF THE STATUTE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
LEGISLATURE'S UNEQUIVOCALLY EXPRESSED
INTENT.

The State correctly notes that statutes should be
construed, where reasonable, to avoid constitutional problems.
Br. Appellee at 23.

However, the constitutional problems at

issue here inhere in the statute, rather than any interpretive
gloss applied to it.

As cases cited in the preceding section

demonstrate, this Court's primary responsibility in construing
the gang enhancement is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature.

Construing § 76-3-203.1 as applying to non-

gangmembers, as the State suggests, requires that this Court
construe the statute to mean something other than what the
legislature intended.

Such a result would be an abdication of

this Court's duty and responsibility to give effect to the intent

21

of the legislature.

Such a corruption of both the judicial and

legislative processes should be avoided.
•

*

*

Mr. Rasmussen relies on his opening brief in response
to those portions of the State's brief not expressly addressed
here.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rasmussen respectfully
requests that this Court strike the gang enhancement statute as
being unconstitutional.

At minimum, the enhancement applied to

his sentence must be vacated as not being supported by the
A

evidence adduced in the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

f

day of June, 1996.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JUDITH A. JENSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Facts admitted as part of guilty pleas (R. 43-45, 94-96)

transaction card offenses; possession of forged writing or device
for writing; and involving one or more of the folloiwng persons:
Justine Woodworth, Christopher Cheeney, Jason Kone, Michael Chad
Hoffman, Brandon Bell, Brandon Winters, Amy Trivitt, Trinidad PenaQuarles, Corene Dillard, "Cat." Defendant agrees to pay restituion
on all dismissed or matters which have not been filed.^
I have received a copy of the information against me, I have
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense (s)
for which I am pleading (guilty).
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as
follows: Count I: On or about 9/30/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah
Defendant,

as

a

party

to

the

offense,

entered

or

remained

unlawfully in the building of Sundance Institute with intent to
commit theft; Count II: On or about 9/30/94, in Salt Lake County,
Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, did obtain or exercise
unauthorized control over the property of Sundance Institute with
a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said
property

exceeded

$1,000;

Count

III

(Burcrlarv) : On or about

11/7/94, Defendant, as a party to the offense, in Salt Lake County,
Utah, did enter or remain unlawfully in the building of Sear Brown
Group with the intent to commit a theft; Count IV (Theft): On or
about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah , Defendant as a party to
the offense, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of the Sear Brown Group with the intent to deprive the
owner thereof, and the value of said property exceeded $1,000;
Count V Burglary: On or about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah,

0 0 0 0 4?

Defendant,

as

a

party

to

the

offense,

did

enter

or

remain

unlawfully in the building of Gump and Ayers Real Estate with the
intent to commit a theft.
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s)
charged are as follows: Count I: On or about 9/30/94, at 307 West
200 South, in Salt Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the
offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the building of Sundance
Institute with intent to commit a theft; Count II (Theft): On or
about 9/30/94, at 307 West 200 South, in Salt Lake County, Utah,
Defendant,

as

a party

to

the

offense,

obtained

or

exercised

unauthorized control over the property of Sundance Institute, to
wit, a money bag and money box containing approximately $2,4000,
several 2-way radios and other items of personal property; with the
intent to deprive the owner thereof; Count III (Burglary): On or
about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to
the

offense,

at

2749

East

Parley's Way,

did

enter or

remain

unlawfully in the building of Sear Brown Group with the intent to
commit a theft; Count IV (Theft) : On or about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake
County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, at 274 9 East
Parley's Way, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of the Sear Brown Group, to wit, a computer system, a
lazer plotter, and a lap top computer, with the intent to deprive
the

owner

$1,000.00;

thereof,

and

Count

(Burglary):

V

the

value
On

of

said

property

or

about

11/7/94,

exceeded
at

2749

Parley's Way, in Salt Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to
4

the offense, did enter or remain unlawfully in the building of Gump
and Ayers with the intent to commit a theft.
I

am

entering

this/these

plea(s)

voluntarily

and

with

knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.
2.

I (have not) waived my right to counsel.

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this

statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my
plea of guilty.
4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is

Judith A. Jensen, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my
attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to

confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them
cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the right

to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in
court in my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf
5

itfi

1

own behalf if you choose, and the right to appeal in the

2

event a jury finds you guilty of the charges that are

3

tried, all of which rights, as well as any others contained

4

on that statement that we haven't discussed you are waiving

5

by the entry of a guilty plea; do you understand?

6

DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN:

7

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And knowing of those waivers, do you

want to proceed with this plea that's outlined here today?

8

e

DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN:
THE COURT:

10

Yes, sir.

And you're doing this freely and

voluntarily?

11
12

DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN:

13 I

THE COURT:

14

Yes, sir.

Are you prepared at this time, Mr.

Rasmussen, to sign this statement?

15

DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN:

16

THE COURT:

17 J

(Whereupon, the defendant signed the document.)

18

J

THE COURT:

Yes.

You may do so.

The defendant and both counsel have

19 J signed the statement of the defendant.
20

Mr. Rasmussen, by having signed this statement,

21 1 you are admitting as true and correct the following facts
22
23
24
26

^nd elements involved in three separate —

excuse me —

in

v

three separate burglary charges, third-degree felony

'burglary charges, and in two separate second-degree felony
charges of theft, that on or about the 30th of September of

14
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1

1994 in Salt Lake County you, a party to the offense, entered]

2

or remained unlawfully in the building of Sundance Institute

3

with the intent to commit a theft.

That's in Count One.

4

in Count Two, that on or about the 30th of

5

September, 1994, in Salt Lake County, you, as a party to the

6

offense, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over

7

the property of Sundance Institute with the purpose to

8

deprive the owner of that property, and the value of that

9

property exceeded $1,000, and Count Three, burglary, that

10

on or about the 7th of November of 1994, you, as a party to

11

the offense, in Salt Lake County, did enter and/or remain

12

unlawfully in the building of Sear Brown Group with the

13

intent to commit a theft, and as to Count Four, theft, that

14

on or about that date, 7 November 1994, in Salt Lake County,

15

you, as a party to the offense, did obtain or exercise

16

unauthorized control over the property of Sear Brown Group

17

with the intent to deprive the owners thereof, and the value

18

of that property exceeded $1,000.

19

that on or about November 7, 1995, in Salt Lake County,

20

that you, a party to the offense, did enter or remain

21

unlawfully in the building of Gump and Ayers Real Estate with

22

the intent to commit a theft, that the events occuring on

23

the 30th day of September of 1994 occurred at 307 West 200

24

South in Salt Lake County, and that the events that

25

occurred on the date of November 7th, 1994, occurred at

Count Five, burglary,

15
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2 74 9 East Parley's Way in Salt Lake County, and that in
each of these entrances into the building or premises of
others you intended to commit a theft therein and indeed,
you did commit thefts,

those

that are outlined in this

statement, and those are the reasons that you are entering
your pleas of guilty in this matter; is that right, Mr.
Rasmussen?
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN:
MS. JENSEN:

Yes, sir.

Your Honor, might I confer with Mr.

Rasmussen just half a minute?
THE COURT:
MS- JENSEN:
THE COURT:
now.

Yes, you may.
Thank you, your Honor.
All right.

We're prepared,

I've forgotten where I was

I think I said to you, Mr. Rasmussen, that you are

entering pleas of guilty in these five separate felony
count charges because you indeed are guilty; is that right?
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And that while you may disagree with

my view and my ruling on the constitutionality of the gang
enhancement provision and you may certainly appeal that,
by the entry of these pleas you are going to be presumed
guilty until such time and if the Court of Appeals or
whomever decides to reverse me in this matter; do you
understand that?
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN:

Yes, your Honor.

16
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ADDENDUM B
Co-Defendant Cheeney's Statement of Defendant,
Certificate of Counsel and Order dated September 8, 1995, R. 2736 in case No. 950720-CA

Third Judicial District

SEP

REBECCA C. HYDE (#6409)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

8 1995

.SALT^KECOUI
By.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
AND ORDER

v.
CHRISTOPHER ALEX CHEENEY,

Defendant.

Case NO.951901609FS
951901608FS
951901610FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

COMES NOW, Christopher Alex Cheeney, the defendant in
this case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following
crime(s):
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION
A.

Count If" Burglary

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT
Min/Max and/or
Min/Mandatory

3 Felony

0v-5 wears prison

76-6-202 U.C.A.

B.

Count 1 1 ^ Theft
76-6-404 U.C.A.

and/or $5,000 fine

2 Felony

1-15 years prison
and/or $10,000 fine
plus 85% surcharge

0 0402?

I have received a copy of the information against me, I
have read it, and I understand the natjire^and elements of the
offense(s) for which I am pleading^ (guilt
The elements of the crime(si of which I am charged are
as follows: 'Count :££:

On or about 1AA25J&A-. in Salt Lake

County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, entered or
£>JU0Ne\CXVVUL

remained u n l a w f u l l y i n t h e b u i l d i n g of &am Wtflluiu
intent to commit theft; Count 11^:

:C

^=>^ "^ o \ < _
BT^LC w i t h

On or about 3^/25794, in Salt

Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, did
. obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of Ssm
\\s\

Wiulli&iL riiiiA-.s with a purpose to deprive the owner therof, and the
value of said property exceeded $5,000.
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s)
charged are as follows:
On or about OcfcebciOctober 25,
2D, 1995",
S
19»y, I entered S^"|
W^i "Lggr' s

»

' Bookstore and took without permission property belonging to Sag*
^^R-FT^S

having a value exceeding $5,000.

I am entering these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge
and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.

I recognize that a

condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount,
as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.

fflM4)2$

2.

I rhave not)

(have) waived my right to counsel.

If I

have waived my^right to counsel, I have done so knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:

3.

If I have waived^rry right to counsel, I have read this

statement and und^f^tand the nature and elements of the charges,
my rights irfchis and other proceedings and the consequences of
my pi€a of guilty.
4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is

REBECCA C. HYDE, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with
my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have
them cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the

right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to
testify in court upon my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be
drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I

need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for
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trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

If

the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid by the State.
10.

I know that the maximum sentence that may be imposed

for each offense to which I plead guilty.

I know that by

pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory
sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum
mandatory sentence for that offense.

I know that the sentences

may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to any fine, an (twenty-five [25%] )
eighty-five [85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated
63-63a-4, will be imposed.

I also know that I may be ordered by

the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime.
11.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive

periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to
more than one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation,

parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have
been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the
present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed
upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am
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waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the
preceding paragraphs.

I also know that by entering such plea(s)

I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct
alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s)
is/are entered.
13.

My plea(s) of guilty is the result of a plea bargain

between myself and the prosecuting attorney.

The promises,

duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully
contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my

plea(s) of guilty I must do so by filing a motion within thirty
(3 0) days after entry of my plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on
the judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as

to what they believe that court may do are also not binding on
the court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind

have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises
except, those contained herein and in the attached plea
agreement, have been made to me.
17.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me

by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know that I

am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement.
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements
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are correct.
18.

I am satisfied with the advise and assistance of my

attorney.
19.

I amJfD years of age; I have attended school through

the \ty grade and I can read and understand the English language
or an interpreter has been provided to me.

I was not under the

influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would
impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the
plea(s).

I am not presently under the influence of any drugs,

medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
20.

I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind,

mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this

cT

day of <jZ>~o.p v > ,

DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for (A(Vt \VWp\VQ C C V J I M X ^ X
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the
statement or that we have read it to him/her and I have discussed
it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent.
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated
and these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate
and true.

/ ^ /

/

/I

TORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR #

t\ to £\ ft O <>

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the
case against v\f\VK4\^NojT VAM&~(\Jl{b/ , defendant I have reviewed
this statement of the defendant and find that the declaration,
including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the
factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct.

No improper

inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully contained in

the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as
supplemented on record before the court.

There is reasonable

cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are
entered and acceptance of the pleas would serve the public
interest.

Q

ROSfeCUT/NG ^Moi^l'tT^ARHP"

,^J^
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ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and certification, the court finds the defendant's plea of guilty
is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the
defendant's plea of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the
statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

Av

day of

VJiy

1995

0 00035

The following terms and conditions of this plea have been
argued to by the defendant, defendant's counsel and the
prosecution:
The State agrees to recommend that the Court
sentence the two counts to run concurrently with each other, gang
enhancement attached.

The State agrees that Defendant's plea

shall be in the nature of a Serv plea and, therefore, conditioned
upon the preservation of Defendant's right to appeal the
constitutionality of the Gang Enhancement Statute.

The State

agrees to dismiss all remaining counts in the present case to
dismiss State v. Cheenev, Case Nos. 951901608FS, 95IVOliSOSgg*, and
951901610FS.

The State agrees not to file any additional charges

arising in Salt Lake County, Utah, during the years 1993 and 1994
involving property crimes, including theft; theft by receiving;
and offenses included in 76-6-408, Utah Code Ann.; robbery;
nonresidential burglary; possession of burglary tools; forgery;
financial transaction card offenses; possession of forged writing
or device for writing; and involving one or more of the following
persons: Justine Woodworth, Bryan Rasmussen, Jason Kone, Michael
Chad Hoffman, Brandon Bell, Brandon Winters, Amy Trivitt,
Trinidad Pena-Ouarles, Corene Dillard, "Cat."

Defendant agrees

to pay restitution on all dismisses or matters which have not
been filed.

The State agrees that this plea is based on evidence

other than statements made by co-defendant Justine Woodword and
the State agrees not to rely on said statements in sentencing.
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